CVE-2026-77329
High 8.8No known exploitationFix status unknownTitle not yet published
Record last updated
CVSS score
High on a 0 to 10 scale
EPSS, chance of exploitation in 30 days
No EPSS score available
CISA remediation deadline
Not in the KEV catalog
Description
Tapo provides Rust and Python APIs and an MCP server for TP-Link Tapo smart devices. From 0.3.1 until 0.5.0, the Streamable HTTP implementation in tapo-mcp/src/server.rs calls disable_allowed_hosts() without replacement Host or Origin validation, while TAPO_MCP_API_KEY remains optional for a listener that can bind to all interfaces. A malicious website can use DNS rebinding to send same-origin browser requests to the victim's local or LAN Tapo MCP listener when it runs without an API key. The attacker can invoke exposed tools including control_device for smart-device actuation and take_snapshot for configured cameras. Deployments with TAPO_MCP_API_KEY set are not affected by the unauthenticated path, and exploitation requires a running listener configured with real Tapo credentials and devices, plus victim interaction with the malicious site. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.0.
Weakness: CWE-346, CWE-350
Patching and mitigation
- Patch status
- Unknown: no source documents a fix
- Mitigation
- None documented
- Vendor guidance
- No vendor link on record
Affected products
No affected products documented yet.
Timeline
- No dated events documented yet.
Vendor guidance and references
- https://github.com/mihai-dinculescu/tapo/commit/cb9c5d4372bddfa11f19dc653a27c9aa4fa92833 (opens in a new tab)
- https://github.com/mihai-dinculescu/tapo/releases/tag/tapo-mcp-v0.5.0 (opens in a new tab)
- https://github.com/mihai-dinculescu/tapo/security/advisories/GHSA-2cwc-6wwp-62q6 (opens in a new tab)