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CVE-2026-68956

High 7.1No known exploitationFix available

SSH daemon allocates unbounded idle session channels, bypassing max_channels

Record last updated

CVSS score

7.1

High on a 0 to 10 scale

EPSS, chance of exploitation in 30 days

0.4%

Higher than 32% of scored CVEs. A prediction, not evidence.

CISA remediation deadline

None

Not in the KEV catalog

Description

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in Erlang/OTP ssh allows an authenticated remote attacker to exhaust node memory by repeatedly opening session channels that are never assigned a handler. The "session" clause of ssh_connection:handle_msg/4 checks only minimal_remote_max_packet_size before calling setup_session/5, which unconditionally builds a #channel{} record and stores it in the ETS channel cache. The max_channels daemon option is consulted only by ssh_channel_sup:max_num_channels_not_exceeded/2, which counts supervisor children, so a channel that never gets a shell, exec, or subsystem handler is invisible to the limit and setting the option to a finite value does not mitigate the attack. RFC 4254 section 5.1 permits many session channels per connection, and each record costs only a few hundred bytes, so a single authenticated connection can accumulate channels until the node runs out of memory and the emulator terminates, affecting every application on it. No file contents, credentials, or write access are obtainable. This issue affects OTP from OTP 18.1.2 before OTP 27.3.4.18, OTP 28.5.0.7, and OTP 29.1.1, corresponding to ssh from 4.1.1 before 5.2.11.13, 5.5.2.6, and 6.0.6. Whether OTP before OTP 18.1.2, corresponding to ssh before 4.1.1, is affected is unknown.

Weakness: CWE-770

Patching and mitigation

Patch status
Fix available (source: Microsoft MSRC)
Fix documented (source date)
Mitigation
No option bounds the number of idle session channels, so the following reduce exposure without eliminating the issue. * Restrict network access to the SSH daemon to trusted clients. Exploitation requires a successfully authenticated session, so limiting who can authenticate is the most effective control available. * Set the max_sessions daemon option to a finite value to bound the number of concurrent connections. This limits how many connections can mount the attack in parallel, though a single connection still suffices to exhaust memory. * Apply operating-system or firewall connection-rate and connection-count limits per source address. * Monitor node memory externally and restart the emulator when it exceeds a threshold. Setting max_channels is not a workaround: idle session channels bypass that check entirely. Source (opens in a new tab)
Vendor guidance
github.com (opens in a new tab)

Affected products

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed inPer
ErlangOTP18.1.2Not documentedCVE Program
ErlangOTP4.1.1Not documentedCVE Program
ErlangOTP84df3d4d0278e21a36a453bfee94799f0df67c2aNot documentedCVE Program
Microsoftazl3 erlang 26.2.5.21-6 on Azure Linux 3.0Not documented26.2.5.21-7Microsoft MSRC
Microsoftazl4 erlang 26.2.5.21-14.azl4 on Azure Linux 4.0Not documented0:26.2.5.21-14.azl4Microsoft MSRC
ErlangOTP (unaffected)79c2d2be17d902c5f53969b5806b725efda831beNot documentedCVE Program
ErlangOTP (unaffected)e18100975f0e5a8d59d02de00df12247a91b443bNot documentedCVE Program
ErlangOTP (unaffected)e2bbad0107bba41491a4d549686fd023db8740daNot documentedCVE Program

Timeline

  1. Disclosure

    CVE record published by EEF

    Source: CVE Program (opens in a new tab)

  2. Advisory

    Microsoft advisory published

    Source: Microsoft MSRC (opens in a new tab)

  3. Advisory change

    Microsoft advisory revised (2.0): Information published.

    Source: Microsoft MSRC (opens in a new tab)

  4. Advisory change

    Microsoft advisory revised (3.0): Information published.

    Source: Microsoft MSRC (opens in a new tab)

  5. Advisory change

    Microsoft advisory revised (4.0): Information published.

    Source: Microsoft MSRC (opens in a new tab)

  6. Patch

    Fix documented by Microsoft MSRC

    Source: Microsoft MSRC (opens in a new tab)

Vendor guidance and references