CVE-2026-66294
Low 2.1No known exploitationFix availableXML injection in Saxy via unescaped CDATA section terminator
Record last updated
CVSS score
Low on a 0 to 10 scale
EPSS, chance of exploitation in 30 days
No EPSS score available
CISA remediation deadline
Not in the KEV catalog
Description
XML injection in the Saxy XML encoder. Saxy.Encoder.cdata/1 serializes a {:cdata, characters} node by wrapping the supplied characters between and passing the payload through byte for byte. The encoder's character-data and attribute-value paths escape the XML metacharacters , &, ", and ', but the CDATA path applies no neutralization at all. XML provides no character escaping mechanism inside a CDATA section, so the only correct way to represent a ]]> substring is to split the section and rejoin it as ]]]]> . Saxy neither performs that split nor rejects the substring. An application that renders untrusted text as CDATA, by building the node with Saxy.XML.cdata/1 and serializing it with Saxy.encode!/2 or Saxy.encode_to_iodata!/2, therefore lets an attacker terminate the section at a position of their choosing. Everything supplied after the ]]> is emitted outside any CDATA context and is parsed as markup, so a single attacker-controlled text field becomes attacker-controlled document structure: arbitrary sibling elements and attributes that the application never built. Downstream consumers of the serialized document accept the injected markup as genuine. Services that generate SOAP envelopes, RSS or Atom feeds, sitemaps, SVG, or XML exports from user-supplied content can have trusted fields forged or overridden. Applications that never place untrusted text in a CDATA node are not affected. This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0.
Weakness: CWE-91
Patching and mitigation
- Patch status
- Fix available (source: CVE record (EEF))
- Fix documented (source date)
- Mitigation
- Render untrusted text as ordinary character data instead of CDATA, by passing a plain string or Saxy.XML.characters/1 to the element builder. That encoder path escapes the XML metacharacters and preserves the same text content. If a CDATA section is required, split the terminator in application code before building the node: replace every occurrence of ]]> in the untrusted text with ]]]]> and pass the result to Saxy.XML.cdata/1. Once the encoder wraps that payload, the output is the standard split encoding. Source (opens in a new tab)
- Vendor guidance
- github.com (opens in a new tab)
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in | Per |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| qcam | saxy | from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0 | 1.7.0 | CVE Program |
| qcam | saxy | from 7266632e9407842f28ffac254c56dc41210a5690 before 71d99fae12f1d6596f5edb57b71f26ba854f4d33 | 71d99fae12f1d6596f5edb57b71f26ba854f4d33 | CVE Program |
Timeline
Disclosure
CVE record published by EEF
Source: CVE Program (opens in a new tab)
Patch
Fix documented by CVE record (EEF)
Vendor guidance and references
- Fix commit 71d99fa in qcam/saxy (opens in a new tab)patch
- https://github.com/qcam/saxy/security/advisories/GHSA-hq6g-j46w-wx72 (opens in a new tab)vendor-advisory, related
- EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-66294 (opens in a new tab)related
- Introducing commit 7266632 in qcam/saxy (opens in a new tab)related
- OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-66294 (opens in a new tab)related