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CVE-2026-65630

Medium 5.9No known exploitationFix available

Timing side-channel in pure-Erlang X25519 scalar multiplication leaks the private key in jose

Record last updated

CVSS score

5.9

Medium on a 0 to 10 scale

EPSS, chance of exploitation in 30 days

0.1%

Higher than 3% of scored CVEs. A prediction, not evidence.

CISA remediation deadline

None

Not in the KEV catalog

Description

Observable Timing Discrepancy vulnerability in potatosalad jose allows recovery of a long-term X25519 private key through a timing side channel in the pure-Erlang Curve25519 fallback. The pure-Erlang X25519 implementation performs scalar multiplication over the secret private key using a recursive Montgomery ladder (jose_jwa_x25519:curve25519/2) whose clauses branch on individual bits of the clamped private scalar, and whose per-step operations (jose_jwa_x25519:montgomery_add/3 and jose_jwa_x25519:montgomery_double/1) and field inversion are built from value-dependent Erlang bignum arithmetic (multiplication, remainder, and modular exponentiation). Although the ladder is operation-count balanced and fixed at 254 steps, the concrete integer values processed at each step, and therefore the running time, depend on the secret scalar. The execution time of the public entry points jose_jwa_x25519:scalarmult/2, jose_jwa_x25519:x25519/2, jose_jwa_x25519:x25519_base/1, and jose_jwa_x25519:sk_to_pk/1 is thus a function of the private key. This path is reachable from the public API, most notably when a service decrypts attacker-supplied ECDH-ES (JWE) messages with a long-term X25519 key (for example through JOSE.JWK.box_decrypt_ecdh_es/2, which reaches jose_jwa_curve25519:x25519_shared_secret/2 and the ladder). An attacker who can submit ciphertexts and measure decryption timing can, in principle, recover the private key bit by bit, defeating the resistance X25519 was designed to provide. Recovery of the key compromises the confidentiality and authenticity of all data protected by it. This issue affects jose: from 1.10.0 before 1.11.13.

Weakness: CWE-208

Patching and mitigation

Patch status
Fix available (source: Microsoft MSRC)
Fix documented (source date)
Mitigation
Use a constant-time native X25519 implementation for private-key operations: install the libsodium or libdecaf NIF, or run on an OTP release whose crypto application provides x25519, and do not force the pure-Erlang Curve25519 fallback (JOSE.crypto_fallback(true) or JOSE.curve25519_module(:jose_jwa_curve25519)) for long-lived keys. Source (opens in a new tab)
Vendor guidance
github.com (opens in a new tab)

Affected products

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed inPer
Microsoftazl3 rabbitmq-server 3.13.7-10 on Azure Linux 3.0Not documentedNot documentedMicrosoft MSRC
potatosaladjosefrom 1.10.0 before 1.11.131.11.13CVE Program
potatosaladjosefrom 8e532095de114ef4bf88a9ec5d651fa251a972b3 before 3670f873c274bba86fb7f5ee5727a7efa1322b793670f873c274bba86fb7f5ee5727a7efa1322b79CVE Program

Timeline

  1. Disclosure

    CVE record published by EEF

    Source: CVE Program (opens in a new tab)

  2. Advisory

    Microsoft advisory published

    Source: Microsoft MSRC (opens in a new tab)

  3. Advisory change

    Microsoft advisory revised (2.0): Information published.

    Source: Microsoft MSRC (opens in a new tab)

  4. Advisory change

    Microsoft advisory revised (3.0): Information published.

    Source: Microsoft MSRC (opens in a new tab)

  5. Patch

    Fix documented by Microsoft MSRC

    Source: Microsoft MSRC (opens in a new tab)

Vendor guidance and references