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CVE-2026-53431

Critical 9.1No known exploitationFix available

Boruta accepts expired JWT client assertions due to missing exp claim validation

Record last updated

CVSS score

9.1

Critical on a 0 to 10 scale

EPSS, chance of exploitation in 30 days

0.5%

Higher than 45% of scored CVEs. A prediction, not evidence.

CISA remediation deadline

None

Not in the KEV catalog

Description

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in malach-it Boruta allows an attacker who has obtained a previously valid JWT client assertion to authenticate as the issuing OAuth client after the assertion has expired. Boruta accepts JWT-based client authentication (client_secret_jwt and private_key_jwt token endpoint authentication methods) but never enforces that the assertion's exp claim is in the future. The pre-check helper Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base.check_expiration/1 in lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex only verifies that an exp claim is present (it pattern-matches on the existence of the key and returns success), and the Joken token configuration used for signature verification, Boruta.Oauth.Authorization.Client.Token.token_config/0 in lib/boruta/oauth/authorization/client.ex, returns an empty map, so Joken's default exp claim validator is not engaged either. Any attacker who obtains a validly-signed client assertion (for example through logs, reverse proxies, browser tooling, or other observability surfaces) can replay it indefinitely to authenticate as the client and obtain access tokens with that client's privileges. This issue affects boruta: from 2.3.0 before 2.3.7 and from 3.0.0-beta.1 onward.

Weakness: CWE-294

Patching and mitigation

Patch status
Fix available (source: CVE record (EEF))
Fix documented (source date)
Mitigation
Restrict the use of JWT-based client authentication (client_secret_jwt and private_key_jwt) to highly trusted clients, and prefer non-JWT client authentication methods (client_secret_basic or client_secret_post) where possible. Where JWT client authentication must remain enabled, issue short-lived client assertions and protect them from exposure in application logs, fronting proxies, browser tooling, and observability systems to reduce the window for replay. Source (opens in a new tab)
Vendor guidance
github.com (opens in a new tab)

Affected products

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed inPer
malach-itborutafrom 2.3.0 before 2.3.72.3.7CVE Program
malach-itboruta3.0.0-beta.1Not documentedCVE Program
malach-itboruta5bfbe1c5443bffe71cf1bf954bbdff61327d9a83Not documentedCVE Program

Timeline

  1. Disclosure

    CVE record published by EEF

    Source: CVE Program (opens in a new tab)

  2. Patch

    Fix documented by CVE record (EEF)

    Source: CVE record (EEF) (opens in a new tab)

Vendor guidance and references