CVE-2026-53431
Critical 9.1No known exploitationFix availableBoruta accepts expired JWT client assertions due to missing exp claim validation
Record last updated
CVSS score
Critical on a 0 to 10 scale
EPSS, chance of exploitation in 30 days
Higher than 45% of scored CVEs. A prediction, not evidence.
CISA remediation deadline
Not in the KEV catalog
Description
Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in malach-it Boruta allows an attacker who has obtained a previously valid JWT client assertion to authenticate as the issuing OAuth client after the assertion has expired. Boruta accepts JWT-based client authentication (client_secret_jwt and private_key_jwt token endpoint authentication methods) but never enforces that the assertion's exp claim is in the future. The pre-check helper Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base.check_expiration/1 in lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex only verifies that an exp claim is present (it pattern-matches on the existence of the key and returns success), and the Joken token configuration used for signature verification, Boruta.Oauth.Authorization.Client.Token.token_config/0 in lib/boruta/oauth/authorization/client.ex, returns an empty map, so Joken's default exp claim validator is not engaged either. Any attacker who obtains a validly-signed client assertion (for example through logs, reverse proxies, browser tooling, or other observability surfaces) can replay it indefinitely to authenticate as the client and obtain access tokens with that client's privileges. This issue affects boruta: from 2.3.0 before 2.3.7 and from 3.0.0-beta.1 onward.
Weakness: CWE-294
Patching and mitigation
- Patch status
- Fix available (source: CVE record (EEF))
- Fix documented (source date)
- Mitigation
- Restrict the use of JWT-based client authentication (client_secret_jwt and private_key_jwt) to highly trusted clients, and prefer non-JWT client authentication methods (client_secret_basic or client_secret_post) where possible. Where JWT client authentication must remain enabled, issue short-lived client assertions and protect them from exposure in application logs, fronting proxies, browser tooling, and observability systems to reduce the window for replay. Source (opens in a new tab)
- Vendor guidance
- github.com (opens in a new tab)
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in | Per |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| malach-it | boruta | from 2.3.0 before 2.3.7 | 2.3.7 | CVE Program |
| malach-it | boruta | 3.0.0-beta.1 | Not documented | CVE Program |
| malach-it | boruta | 5bfbe1c5443bffe71cf1bf954bbdff61327d9a83 | Not documented | CVE Program |
Timeline
Disclosure
CVE record published by EEF
Source: CVE Program (opens in a new tab)
Patch
Fix documented by CVE record (EEF)
Vendor guidance and references
- Fix commit 5204f88 in malach-it/boruta_auth (opens in a new tab)patch
- Fix commit 6936343 in malach-it/boruta_auth (opens in a new tab)patch
- Expired JWT Client Assertions Accepted (opens in a new tab)related, vendor-advisory
- EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-53431 (opens in a new tab)related
- Introducing commit 5bfbe1c in malach-it/boruta_auth (opens in a new tab)related
- OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-53431 (opens in a new tab)related