Skip to content
Threat Brief

← All advisories

CVE-2026-32144

High 7.6No known exploitationFix available

OCSP designated-responder authorization bypass via missing signature verification

Record last updated

CVSS score

7.6

High on a 0 to 10 scale

EPSS, chance of exploitation in 30 days

0.2%

Higher than 12% of scored CVEs. A prediction, not evidence.

CISA remediation deadline

None

Not in the KEV catalog

Description

Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Erlang OTP public_key (pubkey_ocsp module) allows OCSP designated-responder authorization bypass via missing signature verification. The OCSP response validation in public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 does not verify that a CA-designated responder certificate was cryptographically signed by the issuing CA. Instead, it only checks that the responder certificate's issuer name matches the CA's subject name and that the certificate has the OCSPSigning extended key usage. An attacker who can intercept or control OCSP responses can create a self-signed certificate with a matching issuer name and the OCSPSigning EKU, and use it to forge OCSP responses that mark revoked certificates as valid. This affects SSL/TLS clients using OCSP stapling, which may accept connections to servers with revoked certificates, potentially transmitting sensitive data to compromised servers. Applications using the public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 API directly are also affected, with impact depending on usage context. This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/public_key/src/pubkey_ocsp.erl and program routines pubkey_ocsp:is_authorized_responder/3. This issue affects OTP from OTP 27.0 before OTP 27.3.4.10 and OTP 28.4.2, corresponding to public_key from 1.16 before 1.17.1.2 and 1.20.3, and ssl from 11.2 before 11.2.12.7 and 11.5.4.

Weakness: CWE-295

Patching and mitigation

Patch status
Fix available (source: NVD (reference tagged Patch))
Fix documented (source date)
Mitigation
For SSL users: * Do not enable OCSP validation setting (current default is {stapling, no_staple}) * Use CRL-based revocation checking by setting the {crl_check, true} SSL option instead For applications using public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 directly: * Pass {is_trusted_responder_fun, Fun} option with a function that validates trusted responder certificates * Restrict OCSP responder access to trusted endpoints via network controls (only applicable if you control the OCSP infrastructure) Source (opens in a new tab)
Vendor guidance
github.com (opens in a new tab)

Affected products

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed inPer
ErlangOTP1.16Not documentedCVE Program
ErlangOTP11.2Not documentedCVE Program
ErlangOTP27.0Not documentedCVE Program
ErlangOTP601a012837ea0a5c8095bf24223132824177124dNot documentedCVE Program
erlangerlang/otpfrom 27.0 before 27.3.4.1027.3.4.10NIST NVD
erlangerlang/otpfrom 28.0 before 28.4.228.4.2NIST NVD
erlangerlang/public_keyfrom 1.16 before 1.17.1.21.17.1.2NIST NVD
erlangerlang/public_keyfrom 1.18 before 1.20.31.20.3NIST NVD
erlangerlang/sslfrom 11.2 before 11.2.12.711.2.12.7NIST NVD
erlangerlang/sslafter 11.3 before 11.5.411.5.4NIST NVD

Timeline

  1. Disclosure

    CVE record published by EEF

    Source: CVE Program (opens in a new tab)

  2. Patch

    Fix documented by NVD (reference tagged Patch)

    Source: NVD (reference tagged Patch) (opens in a new tab)

Vendor guidance and references