CVE-2026-130161
Medium 5.3No known exploitationFix status unknownTamari: SSRF via DNS rebinding bypasses is_safe_autofill_url() in recipe autofill
Record last updated
CVSS score
Medium on a 0 to 10 scale
EPSS, chance of exploitation in 30 days
Higher than 41% of scored CVEs. A prediction, not evidence.
CISA remediation deadline
Not in the KEV catalog
Description
Tamari is a fully-featured recipe manager web application built using Python and the Flask Framework. Prior to 1.7.2, an authenticated user can bypass the recipe-autofill SSRF check by submitting a hostname under the user's control through the Autofill from URL feature; the hostname can resolve to a public address during validation and a private or internal address during the later connection. In app/myrecipes/routes.py, is_safe_autofill_url validates the first DNS response, but recipe autofill passes the original URL to requests.get, which independently resolves the hostname and can connect to the internal address. The fetched response is parsed into recipe fields, enabling internal-service reconnaissance and potential data exposure; no redirect is required, and disabling redirects does not stop this DNS-rebinding bypass. This issue is fixed in 1.7.2.
Weakness: CWE-918
Patching and mitigation
- Patch status
- Unknown: no source documents a fix
- Mitigation
- None documented
- Vendor guidance
- No vendor link on record
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions | Fixed in | Per |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| alexbates | Tamari | < 1.7.2 | Not documented | CVE Program |
Timeline
Disclosure
CVE record published by GitHub_M
Source: CVE Program (opens in a new tab)
Vendor guidance and references
- https://github.com/alexbates/Tamari/commit/50f69e3e66c0f41aaab013838340dcdb868dd958 (opens in a new tab)x_refsource_misc
- https://github.com/alexbates/Tamari/releases/tag/v1.7.2 (opens in a new tab)x_refsource_misc
- https://github.com/alexbates/Tamari/security/advisories/GHSA-fj24-576j-7fh7 (opens in a new tab)x_refsource_confirm