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CVE-2026-130161

Medium 5.3No known exploitationFix status unknown

Tamari: SSRF via DNS rebinding bypasses is_safe_autofill_url() in recipe autofill

Record last updated

CVSS score

5.3

Medium on a 0 to 10 scale

EPSS, chance of exploitation in 30 days

0.5%

Higher than 41% of scored CVEs. A prediction, not evidence.

CISA remediation deadline

None

Not in the KEV catalog

Description

Tamari is a fully-featured recipe manager web application built using Python and the Flask Framework. Prior to 1.7.2, an authenticated user can bypass the recipe-autofill SSRF check by submitting a hostname under the user's control through the Autofill from URL feature; the hostname can resolve to a public address during validation and a private or internal address during the later connection. In app/myrecipes/routes.py, is_safe_autofill_url validates the first DNS response, but recipe autofill passes the original URL to requests.get, which independently resolves the hostname and can connect to the internal address. The fetched response is parsed into recipe fields, enabling internal-service reconnaissance and potential data exposure; no redirect is required, and disabling redirects does not stop this DNS-rebinding bypass. This issue is fixed in 1.7.2.

Weakness: CWE-918

Patching and mitigation

Patch status
Unknown: no source documents a fix
Mitigation
None documented
Vendor guidance
No vendor link on record

Affected products

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed inPer
alexbatesTamari< 1.7.2Not documentedCVE Program

Timeline

  1. Disclosure

    CVE record published by GitHub_M

    Source: CVE Program (opens in a new tab)

Vendor guidance and references