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CVE-2026-105963

Medium 5.1No known exploitationFix available

Secret key base exposed in stack trace arguments on wrong-typed Plug.Crypto arguments

Record last updated

CVSS score

5.1

Medium on a 0 to 10 scale

EPSS, chance of exploitation in 30 days

0.5%

Higher than 44% of scored CVEs. A prediction, not evidence.

CISA remediation deadline

None

Not in the KEV catalog

Description

Externally-Generated Error Message Containing Sensitive Information vulnerability in plug_crypto in elixir-plug plug_crypto allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to expose the secret key base through application logs via a wrong-typed argument. Every public function in Plug.Crypto validates argument types in a function-head guard. A failed guard makes the Erlang VM raise FunctionClauseError with the actual argument values in the top stack frame, so the secret key base, a derived key, or the value an API key is compared against lands in that frame. The library's rescue blocks and Plug.Crypto.prune_args_from_stacktrace/1 only reach exceptions raised inside a function body, so they never see a guard failure. Plug.Cowboy and Bandit write the frame to the error log and attach it as crash_reason Logger metadata, which error trackers forward. Two entry points take request data. Plug.Crypto.verify/4 exposes the secret key base when the token is neither a binary nor nil, which Phoenix.Token.verify/4 reaches because it forwards the token unguarded. Plug.Crypto.secure_compare/2 exposes the other operand when one side is not a binary, as happens when a missing request header yields nil. Reading the leaked value needs separate access to the logs or the error tracker, so the request alone does not disclose the secret to the attacker. This issue affects plug: from 1.6.3 before 1.7.0; plug_crypto: from 1.0.0 before 2.2.1.

Weakness: CWE-532

Patching and mitigation

Patch status
Fix available (source: CVE record (EEF))
Fix documented (source date)
Mitigation
Check argument types in the calling code before entering Plug.Crypto, so no head guard ever fails. Pass a token to Phoenix.Token.verify/4, Phoenix.Token.decrypt/4, Plug.Crypto.verify/4 or Plug.Crypto.decrypt/4 only when is_binary(token) holds, and treat anything else as an invalid token. Call Plug.Crypto.secure_compare/2 only when both operands are binaries, treating a missing header or parameter as a failed comparison rather than passing nil. Where the leaked value matters more than the crash, configuring the error tracker to drop stack-frame arguments also keeps the secret out of the forwarded report. For Sentry this means not sending vars with the crash report. This narrows exposure but leaves the value in the local error log. Source (opens in a new tab)
Vendor guidance
github.com (opens in a new tab)

Affected products

VendorProductAffected versionsFixed inPer
elixir-plugplugfrom 1.6.3 before 1.7.01.7.0CVE Program
elixir-plugplug56000c33d8a0a2fbac491f8be06b9c5112bc2276Not documentedCVE Program
elixir-plugplug_cryptofrom 1.0.0 before 2.2.12.2.1CVE Program
elixir-plugplug_cryptofrom 2d078b7b8264c565f0ff71235c515f4f46882dcf before 981887493dada0fce7003c61861c00dfbb0fc8c5981887493dada0fce7003c61861c00dfbb0fc8c5CVE Program

Timeline

  1. Disclosure

    CVE record published by EEF

    Source: CVE Program (opens in a new tab)

  2. Patch

    Fix documented by CVE record (EEF)

    Source: CVE record (EEF) (opens in a new tab)

Vendor guidance and references